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Abstract 
While the currency board served Estonia well during transition in the 1990s, it has limited its ability to 
counter the impact of the global financial crisis and heightened the currency risks. The euro adoption has 
thus become a top policy priority again. However, this paper finds that even after almost two decades of 
hard peg with the core of the euro zone shocks affecting Estonia are relatively weakly synchronized with 
those of the zone, contributing to large output volatility. Nevertheless, the case for euro adoption by 
Estonia holds, since the costs of the loss of independent monetary policy were paid, and – as the global 
financial crisis demonstrated – the currency board is no substitute for the common currency. To reduce 
future output volatility, Estonia should move to counter-cyclical fiscal policies, maintain labor and 
product market flexibility, and adopt policies stimulating rise in the knowledge and high-tech content of 
its production.  
JEL classification: E32; F42; C53 
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1.  Introduction 
In 1992, shortly after regaining independence from the Soviet Union, Estonia left 
the ruble zone and established its own currency (Kroon), which helped gather support 
for difficult reforms associated with the transition to a market economy. Simultaneously, 
the country introduced currency board, pegged initially to the German mark and since 
1999 to euro. Under this regime the monetary base became fully backed by the foreign 
exchange reserves of the Bank of Estonia, the Kroon was completely convertible, and 
all restrictions on capital account transactions were abolished. With the adoption of the 
currency board, Estonia gave up its exchange rate and monetary policy in order to 
enhance credibility of its monetary stance and reduce inflation.
5 The money supply 
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became endogenous, consisting of exchanging domestic currency at a fixed exchange 
rate to the currency that forms the reserve (Sepp and Randveer, 2002).  
The currency board arrangement increased credibility by eliminating any 
possibility of discretionary monetary easing, since lending by the Bank of Estonia to the 
domestics banking sector or for government needs was prohibited except to banks 
experiencing systemic risks. Even in such situations, the lending could not exceed the 
accumulated excess foreign exchange reserves over the monetary base (Knöbl, Sutt and 
Zavoico, 2002). By doing so, the board constrained the policy space to respond to 
future asymmetric shocks with respect to the euro area. It also limited the possibility for 
the central bank to provide liquidity to the banking sector in the event of a financial 
crisis to the amount of excess reserves over the monetary base. By joining the EU and 
the ERM II in June 2004 and aiming at an early euro adoption (at the prevailing 
exchange rate), Estonia has solidified its commitment to permanently fixed exchange 
rate regime.
6 In other words, Estonian policy makers viewed euro adoption – at the 
prevailing exchange rate -- as the most appropriate exit strategy from the currency board 
(Lättemäe and Randveer, 2006).  
The currency board served the country well during the 1990s and in fact played a 
key role in successful stabilization efforts, with inflation falling from high double digits 
in 1993 to low single digits by the late 1990s. During the 2000s, however, the benefits of 
the currency board declined. Estonia was one of the fastest growing emerging market 
economies in the world during this period, and until 2005 also had low inflation. 
However, growth was unbalanced, driven by non-tradables (especially the real estate 
sector) and financed by large capital inflows, which in turn fuelled domestic credit 
expansion, mostly in foreign currency. The combination of complete convertibility of 
the capital account with the currency board facilitated these capital inflows, as the 
currency board constrained the Bank of Estonia’s room to mitigate the inflows and 
curtail the growth of private sector credit. Eventually, the credit boom created systemic 
risks to the banking sector through heavy exposure to international funding. The 
inflexible monetary policy framework implied that exchange rate adjustments were not 
possible to counter the severe adverse external shock when the global financial crisis hit. 
These factors contributed to a severe recession that Estonia experienced in 2009 
(Brixiova, Vartia and Wörgötter, 2010).
7  
Given the large share of the private sector credit denominated in foreign currency 
and the associated currency risk, the global financial and economic crisis has made euro 
adoption even more attractive and put it on top of the country’s policy agenda (Bank of 
Estonia, 2009). The heightened currency risk during the crisis demonstrated that the 
currency board is not a substitute for joining the euro area.
8 The enhanced interest has 
been driven mostly by the desire to eliminate this risk, triggered by the speculation in 
the wake of the global crisis. Estonia was able to maintain an orderly financial system 
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throughout the crisis largely due to good cross-border cooperation and provision of 
liquidity from the Nordic banks, which account for 95 percent of the Estonian banking 
market.
9 
The objectives of the paper are threefold. First, using several empirical methods, 
the paper establishes that the alignment of Estonia’s shocks with those of the euro area, 
one of the preconditions for joining currency area posited by the optimal currency area 
approach, is low. Second, drawing on the existing literature, the paper suggests that in a 
small open economy with strong trade linkages to the euro zone such as Estonia 
benefits of the fixed exchange rate regime on balance still outweigh the cost created by 
the lack of alignment. Moreover, the paper posits that the recent financial crisis has 
illustrated the advantages of common currency zone and increased the case for the euro 
adoption in Estonia, given its large share of foreign-denominated debt. Third, the paper 
briefly discusses policies that can help mitigate the cost of Estonia’s incomplete business 
cycle synchronization with the euro zone.  
The paper is organized as follows. After this Introduction which provides a brief 
background on the Estonian monetary policy framework, Section 2 conducts empirical 
analysis on the degree of synchronization of Estonia’s business cycles with those of the 
euro area. Section 3 posits that euro adoption would be beneficial for Estonia. Section 4 
concludes. While this paper focuses on Estonia, its conclusions can apply to other 
countries with either a currency board or a fixed exchange rate regime and weak 
business cycle synchronization with the euro zone, such as the other two Baltic 
countries. 
2.  How Synchronized is Estonia with the Euro Zone? 
The interest among policy makers and researches in the cyclical alignment of the 
new EU members with the euro area started in the 1990s and picked up around the EU 
enlargement period. It has remained high since most of the new EU members still have 
the EMU accession ahead of them and was only heightened by the global financial and 
economic crisis.
10 The objective of this section is to reassess the business cycle 
synchronization between Estonia and the euro area, utilizing several empirical methods 
and recent data. 
It needs to be underscored that in the case of Estonia, the degree of 
synchronization with the euro zone does not affect anymore the country’s decision 
whether to join the common currency area or not. This is because Estonia has been 
paying the price of abolishing independent monetary and exchange rate policies to 
counter adverse shocks since the introduction of the currency board in 1992. Hence 
joining EMU will not create a new challenge in this respect, as the challenge of coping 
with adverse shocks through alternative mechanisms already exists under the currency 
board. Still, Estonian policymakers need to be aware of the degree of cyclical alignment 
of their economy with the euro zone in order to determine to what extent such 
                                                 
9 In the fall of 2008 a run on one of the branches of a major Nordic bank occurred, but the parent bank 
supplied liquidity swiftly. In February 2009, the Bank of Estonia strengthened its capacity to provide 
liquidity by signing a precautionary agreement with the Swedish Central Bank. 
10. Slovenia joined the euro area in January 2007 and the Slovak Republic in January 2009. 206 
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mechanisms should be employed. This becomes particularly important in the context of 
the post-crisis recovery, as there are concerns that Estonia’s return to trend growth 
could take longer than in the EMU countries.  
2.1 Background Theory 
The empirical analysis below draws on the traditional optimal currency area 
(OCA) theory (Mundell, 1961 and others), which posits that symmetry of 
macroeconomic shocks is a key consideration for participation in a monetary union (or 
adopting fixed exchange rate). The traditional OCA analysis claims that membership in 
a currency union provides economic efficiency gains by relieving the member country of 
the macro economic instability risk, provided its business cycles are synchronized with 
those of the currency area. Asymmetric, country-specific shocks would weaken the case 
for a common currency/peg and increase the need for an independent monetary policy 
and a flexible exchange rate regime. Costs of pegs, and especially monetary unions, thus 
rise with diverging business cycles.
 11 Business cycles may not be synchronized due to 
asymmetric shocks and/or differences in the transmission mechanisms of common 
shocks, but structural similarity reduces the impact of these factors. 
Even with asymmetric shocks in place, the exchange rate and monetary policy 
tools can be relinquished in countries with mobile labour (Mundell, 1961), a high degree 
of economic openness (McKinnon, 1963), and diversification in production and 
consumption (Kenen, 1969). Other factors that ease monetary integration include 
flexible wages and prices, financial integration, and counter-cyclical fiscal policy which is 
effective in stabilizing the economy. However, the original OCA work abstracted from 
important benefits of monetary integration/pegged to a strong currency, most notably 
enhanced credibility, but also lower transaction costs and increased political integration. 
The political aspect became relevant in, for example, Italy, where the euro adoption 
helped insulating financial markets from disruptive political events, such as collapses of 
governments and resignations (Fratzscher and Stracca, 2009). 
The backward looking OCA approach cannot address structural and other 
changes resulting from the monetary integration. Specifically, the OCA endogeneity 
hypothesis of Frankel and Rose (1998) argues that some of the OCA criteria, especially 
the synchronization of business cycles, will become more fulfilled once the country joins 
a monetary union. Austria is considered to be an example of a country which did not 
constitute an OCA (with Deutsche Mark) in 1980s, but now forms an OCA with the 
euro area. Hochreiter and Tavlas (2004) conclude for Austria that: “… the hard peg 
mattered because it mustered a domestic constituency in favor of change, providing the 
impetus for the domestic economy to become more flexible so that the peg could be 
sustained. The hard peg also furnished a disciplinary framework for sound 
macroeconomic policies.” A similar statement can be made of Estonia, which with the 
onset of the currency board introduced a fiscal rule of an annually balanced budget and 
kept its public debt at a minimum. It made its labor markets more flexible than new EU 
member states with flexible exchange rate regimes (Brixiova, 2009). 
                                                 
11 OCA theory identifies factors that may lead to excessive output volatility under a fixed exchange rate 
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Another stream of research on structural similarity argues that with intensified 
trade, countries would draw more on their comparative advantages and become less 
diversified. This paradigm posits that if the country’s trade with the common area 
currency is not intensive and/or it is mostly inter-sectoral, shocks would be asymmetric. 
The empirical work shows that integration raises share of intra-industry trade and shock 
synchronization. Imbs (2004) found that the share of intra-industry trade in the euro 
area has increased significantly since  1999. Fidrmuc (2004) showed in his work on 
Central and Eastern Europe that the intra-industry trade rather than total trade matters 
for convergence.  
In line with this theoretical underpinning, the extent of Estonia’s cyclical 
alignment with the euro zone is assessed below through (i) the degree of structural 
similarity (including intra-industry trade) and (ii) shock synchronization between Estonia 
and the euro zone. Structural similarity is measured in terms of extent of intra-industry 
trade and similarity of production. The degree of similarity of shocks is examined 
through structural VAR. While the empirical literature on the cyclical alignment of the 
new EU members with EMU is well advanced, research on Estonia and the other Baltic 
countries is sparse.
12 This paper thus adds to this stream of academic literature by 
carrying out a new empirical analysis on the extent of Estonia’s synchronization with the 
euro area, utilizing several methods and more recent data. The paper also examines 
whether the alignment has increased since the Estonian Kroon was pegged to euro 
in 1999 (continuing the Deutschmark peg since 1992).  
2.2 Structural Similarity 
2.2.1 Structural Similarity Measured by Value Added 
The structural similarity of production between Estonia and the euro area is 
measured in terms of Bray-Curtis index (Figure 1). Denoting  ij x  to be the share of 
sector iin the total value added of country j , with countries in this case being Estonia 
and the euro zone, and N as total number of sector, the index can be defined as:  
∑
∑
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By design, the index takes values between [0,1]. Since the index is essentially a 
metric based on distance, lower values indicate a greater structural similarity between 
sectoral contributions to total values added in Estonia and the euro area. According to 
this index, Estonia’s production structure – when measured by four key categories 
(agriculture, industry, construction and services) – converged towards that of the euro-
16 countries during 1995 – 2008 (Figure 1). In fact, when measured by these four 
                                                 
12 Exceptions include Jurgutyte (2006) who utilizes structural VAR for examining business cycle 
synchronization in Lithuania and the euro area and more recently Fadejeva and Melihovs (2008) who 
employ factor component analysis.  208 
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categories, Estonia’s production structure is more similar to the euro area’s one than the 
production structures of the other two Baltic countries as well as than the structures of 
the current euro-zone members, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. After a rapid 
convergence in late 1990s caused by a reallocation of production and employment from 
the industry to services, Estonia’s production structure has began to broadly resemble to 
that of advanced euro zone countries, such as Belgium and Austria. A key factor behind 
the Estonia’s structural divergence form the euro-16 average during 2005-2007 has been 
the rapid increase of the share of construction in output. 
 
Figure 1. Bray-Curtis structural similarity index, 1995-2008 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ameco data. 
 
However, when the four main sectors (agriculture, industry, construction and 
services) are subdivided further, Estonia’s production structure becomes notably less 
akin to that of the euro zone, especially those of the advanced countries. This is because 
of the relatively low high-tech and knowledge component in Estonia’s production and 
employment (Figure 2). Specifically, even though Estonia has a relatively high rate of 
tertiary graduates, its shares of employment in high-tech sectors and knowledge 
intensive services are low. In fact, most of the jobs created during 2000–07 were in 
sectors with low shares of skilled employment, such as construction and trade 
(Eurofound, 2008 and OECD, 2009). In contrast, in the neighbouring Finland, most of 
the new jobs were in knowledge-intensive services, such as business services, health, and 
education.
13  
                                                 
13. According to Olenko (2006), Estonia differed from EU14 average (EU15 excl. Luxembourg) during 
1993-2001 in part due to concentration of services in transport and communication relative to more 
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2.2.2 Structural Similarity Measured by Intra-Industry Trade 
Another indicator of structural similarity is the Grubel-Lloyd Index of 
intra-industry trade, which measures the intensity of Estonia’s trade with the euro area. 
Estonia’s trade with the EU has been intensive and increased over the years –  in 
2000-07 exports to the EU amounted to over 70% of total exports (Table 1), while 
imports accounted for about 80% of total imports. However, the share of intra-industry 
trade with the euro zone has remained low in 2007 (Figure 3), indicating that Estonia’s 
comparative advantages have been more driven by factor endowment than product and 
process specific specialization and learning by doing.
14 This relatively high specialization 
in low quality products thus exposes Estonia to risks of external asymmetric shocks, as 
argued in Trotignon (2003) and demonstrated by the global financial crisis.  
 
Figure 2. Estonia: share of employed with tertiary education and share of sectors in total employment in 2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Statistics Estonia.  
                                                 
14 Gabrisch and Senana (2003) decomposed intra-industry trade into horizontal and vertical shares and 
found that vertical structures predominated, with the EU demonstrating comparative advantage in higher 
quality products and the transition economies in lower-quality products after trade liberalization 
materialized.  
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Table 1. Direction of exports of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 1994-2007 
   Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania 
   1994-99  2000-07  1994-99 2000-07 1994-99 2000-07 
  (in % of total exports) 
EU  total  65.0 72.9 60.5 75.0 56.7 65.4 
Advanced  EU  51.2 58.5 39.4 51.0 37.2 41.2 
Emerging  EU  13.8 14.4 21.1 24.0 19.5 24.2 
Russia  15.4 8.2  18.1 9.0  19.8 11.8 
Source: Obiora (2009).  
 
Figure 3. Estonia: Grubel-Lloyd index of Estonia’s intra-industry trade, 1999-200715 
 
Note: 0 indicates no intra-industry trade, while 100 indicates that all trade is intra-industry. Main trading partners are 
32 countries which account for 85% to 90% of Estonia’s total trade. Euro area 12 is the euro area 15 except for 
Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta. The results were estimated at the 4-digit level of SITC Rev 3 and aggregated using shares. 
See OECD Economic Outlook No. 71, June 2002, pp. 159-170. Source: UN Comtrade database and authors’ 
calculations.  
                                                 
15 The Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade (IIT) in product class i  between countries A and B 
is 
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2.3 Synchronization of Economic Shocks 
2.3.1 Correlation of Economic Activity 
First, we examine whether synchronization of economic shocks between Estonia 
and the euro zone exists using simple correlation coefficients for output and inflation. 
As Figure 4 illustrates, Estonia’s correlation of the real GDP growth with the Euro area 
countries has been lower than most euro zone (Slovenia), but exceeded that of Ireland 
and the Slovak Republic (which joined EMU in 2009). While correlation of the inflation 
rate was low, this was the case for several smaller euro zone members as well.  
 
Figure 4. Correlation of GDP growth and inflation between selected countries and the euro area, Q1 2001 – 
Q1 2008 
 
Note: Growth is the current compared to the previous quarter and inflation is growth of the GDP deflator. The euro area 
countries (15 as of 2008) are displayed in capital letters. Source: Eurostat and OECD National Accounts Database. 
2.3.2 Structural VAR Approach 
This section utilizes the structural VAR framework to identify the nature of the 
underlying shocks that the Estonia’s economy faces and how similar they are to those 
faced by the euro area. Two formal, and complementary, approaches are adopted. Both 
methods indicate that Estonia’s structural shocks are not particularly aligned with those 
of the euro area, and that the country-specific factors play an important role. 
  212 
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(i) What Role do Euro Area Shocks Play in Estonia’s Output Fluctuations?  
To shed some light on this question, first a graph showing quarterly real GDP 
growth rates (quarter-on-quarter) of Estonia and the euro zone is presented, which 
shows that the output volatility in Estonia is very high – of a completely different 
magnitude than in the euro zone (Figure 5). The rest of the analysis in this section 
follows from this observation. 
In the paragraphs below, a variance decomposition of Estonia’s output 
fluctuations through the Choleski decomposition is carried out. Variation in the change 
of the forecast error was decomposed into global, regional and country-specific output 
shocks. Global shocks are represented by the group of OECD countries, regional ones 
by the euro zone, and the country-specific by Estonia.  
 
Figure 5. Quarterly real GDP growth (q-o-q), Q1 1995 – Q1 2008 (in percent) 
 
Source: Eurostat and OECD National Accounts Database. 
 
The three variables of the model -- global output,
G y , regional output,
R y , and 
country output, 
C y  -- are subject to three shocks –  global,
G ε , regional, 
R ε , and 
country-specific,
C ε . All variables are in logarithm. The VAR model can be represented 
in its reduced form as follows:  
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where ..., ) (
2 2 1 0 + + + = L a L a a L A ij ij ij ij  is a polynomial function of the lag operator, 
L. The structural shocks in (1) are assumed to be uncorrelated and of unit variance –
I Var = ) (ε . Identification is obtained using Choleski decomposition with the variables 
ordered as above. In sum: (i) country-specific shocks have no effect on either the 
regional or global output; and (ii) regional shocks have no effects on the global output, 
that is  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 23 13 12 = = = A A A .
16 This procedure then amounts to the following 
economic assumptions about the effects of the shocks:  
•  Global shocks affect output in all countries, i.e. are due to global events, such as oil 
price shock or changes in international interest rates; 
•  Regional shocks affect output in the euro area, and are due to common regional 
events, such as EU enlargement; and  
•  Country-specific shocks affect output in individual countries only, and are due to, 
changes in macroeconomic policy, consumer sentiment, terms of trade shocks or 
productivity shocks, among others. 
Results 
Quarterly, seasonally adjusted data for 1997Q2-2008Q3 were obtained from the 
OECD database. In the VARs, variables included are the first differences of (the log of) 
quarterly real GDP. Global growth was represented by the group of OECD countries, 
regional growth by the euro area (as of December 2008), and the country-specific 
growth by Estonia. 
The VAR model satisfies the standard requirements. Time series property of the 
data was investigated with the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test and the KPSS 
test.
17 Standard information criterion (Akaike, Schwarz, and Hannon-Quinn) was used 
to choose the lag length. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test indicates that the residuals 
at 1
st and 4
th lags show no sign of being serially correlated. Finally, the Jarque-Bera test 
suggests that data are from a normal distribution. Variance decomposition (using the 
recursive Choleski decomposition) was conducted to identify the contribution of global 
regional and country-specific to changes in the Estonia’s growth, with the variables 
ordered as in (2).  
Table 2 gives results at the 20
th quarter horizons for the output variation of 
Estonia’s output. Specifically, variation in the percentage change of the forecast error of 
changes was decomposed into global, regional and country-specific output at the 1 
through 20 quarter horizons. A significant role for the regional shocks in Estonia’s 
output fluctuations would indicate that the country meets the shock synchronization 
criterion of the OCA theory. However, Table 2 shows that on the basis of the 1997-
2008 estimation, domestic shocks accounted for majority of the Estonian GDP growth 
volatility, which can be ascribed to the specificities of transition, including the impact of 
the Russian crises, and the relatively low share of intra-sectoral trade with the euro area. 
                                                 
16 This approach follows Kim and Chow (2003) and is akin to that of IMF (2005) and Kose, Otrok and 
Prasad (2008). 
17 At least one of these tests confirmed the first difference stationarity at 5% confidence level (Annex I).  214 
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Specifically, in Estonia, domestic shocks accounted for most of the GDP growth 
volatility during 1997-2008. Euro area shocks accounted for less than 10%.
18 
As an alternative to euro area shocks, narrower regional aggregates were calculated 
for Sweden and Finland. The Sweden/Finland regional shocks also explained only about 
4% of the Estonia’s output variance, but this rises somewhat if we identify regional 
growth factors with the Scandinavian-Baltic aggregate. Still, local factors remain much 
more important in Estonia than in Finland (Table  2). The important role of 
Estonia-specific shocks reflects the specificities of transition, the heavy impact of the 
1998 Russian crises, and the low share of intra-sectoral trade with the euro area. The 
results confirm that synchronization of Estonia’s cycle with the euro area has been low. 
 
Table 2. Variance decomposition of output growth 
Percentage of output variation accounted for by shocks in 
 OECD  Euro  area  Estonia 
Estonia  14.6  4.6  80.8 
 OECD  Euro  area  Finland 
Finland  43.3  6.9  49.7 
 OECD  Scandinavian/Baltic  area  Estonia 
Estonia  16.0  15.8  68.2 
 OECD  Sweden/Finland  Estonia 
 Estonia  24.1  3.8  72.0 
Note: Factorisation used the Cholesky decomposition. Results are reported at the 20th quarter horizon for the variation of 
Estonia’s output. 
Source: Eurostat and OECD National Accounts databases and authors’ calculations. 
 
As the above results show, Estonia has been subject mostly to country-specific 
shocks. The absence of nominal exchange rate adjustment as a way of mitigating the 
asymmetric shocks has been quite costly and necessitated development of other 
adjustment mechanism. The observation that Estonia’s shock synchronization with the 
euro zone has been low can then partly explain why the country developed more 
flexible labor and product markets than other new EU members with flexible exchange 
rate arrangements (OECD, 2009). 
 
                                                 
18. Results are consistent with IMF (2005), where the country-specific factors explain more than 60% 
volatility in about 90% of emerging market and developing countries. The global factor explains less 
than 10% of output volatility for more than 60% of these countries.  
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(ii) Synchronization of Economic Shocks 
This evaluates business cycle synchronization between Estonia and the euro zone, 
utilizing the structural VAR model with decomposition along the lines of Blanchard and 
Quah (1989).  More specifically, this section applies a bivariate structural VAR model 
to recover the underlying demand and supply shocks in Estonia and to determine the 
degree of their correlation with the euro area shocks. The aim is to identify the nature of 
the shocks affecting Estonia, their synchronization with those of the euro area and 
whether these shocks have become more synchronized over time. The main conclusion 
is that while synchronization of Estonia’s business cycles with the euro zone has been 
relatively low, it has increased over time.  
Our structural VAR model is based on the aggregate supply-aggregate demand 
model, which consists of two variables –  output and prices. Fluctuations in these 
variables are assumed to be due to supply and demand shocks. Supply shocks are driven 
by structural changes in the economy, such as changes in oil prices, technology, and the 
labor force. Demand shocks consist of i)  real shocks such as changes in consumer 
confidence, abrupt shifts in government spending, and ii)  nominal shocks such as 
changes in expected inflation, monetary policy, or shocks in foreign exchange markets.  
A positive supply shock has a permanent positive impact on output, whereas 
positive demand shock has only temporary positive impact on output. In contrast, both 
supply and demand shocks have a permanent impact on the price level – positive supply 
shock reduces price level while positive demand shock increases it.
19 Formally: 
 
()
S
t t t t t t
S
t p E p y E y ε α + − + = − − 1 1        ( 2 )  
D
t t
D
t t t
D
t p y E p y ε + + = + − ) ( 1         ( 3 )  
D
t
S
t t y y y = =           ( 4 )  
 
where t y   is (the log of) output in period t, and  t t y E 1 −   is (the log of) output 
expected in period t given information at t-1. Similarly,  t p  is (the log of) price level in 
period t, while  t t p E 1 −  is (the log of) price level expected at t-1. The superscripts S and D 
represent supply and demand, and 
S
t ε  and 
D
t ε denote the (serially uncorrelated) 
structural aggregate supply and structural aggregate demand shock, respectively.  
Equation (2) is the AS curve, where output increases with unexpected increases in 
the price level and positive supply shocks. The AD increases with its expected value and 
positive demand shocks (3).
 20 System (2) – (4) can be solved for output and the prices, 
so that in the matrix form the model is described by:  
                                                 
19 In Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), the impact of supply and demand shocks on the price level are 
referred to as an over-identifying condition, used in ex-post evaluation of the model.  
20 This framework has been used in, for example, Cover, Enders and Hueng (2006) or Jurgutyte (2006) 
for Lithuania. Sections below follow the same approach as in these articles.  216 
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The system described by (5) exhibits a systemic relationship between prices and 
output in the short run, but the long-run independence of nominal and real variables 
continues to hold, as the short run AS curve is upward sloping, but the long-run AS 
curve is vertical. In this framework, the responses of output and inflation to positive 
demand and supply shocks are as follows:
  
 
Table 3. Predicted Dynamic Responses from the above AD-AS Framework 
     Short-run  Long-run 
AS shock  positive  positive  Output response to 
positive   AD shock  positive  neutral 
AS shock  negative  negative  Inflation response to 
positive   AD shock  positive  positive 
 
Identification (based on Blanchard and Quah (1989) decomposition) 
A joint process of output and prices (5) can be also written as an infinite moving 
average representation of supply and demand shocks (as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 
1993):  
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i L   is the lag operator. The matrices 
i A represent the impulse response functions that transmit effects of the shocks to the 
variables (elements of  t X ). A finite version of (6) can be estimated as VAR:  
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The matrices  i B can be estimated.
21 The regression residuals  yt e ,  pt e  are 
composed of the underlying structural supply and demand shocks 
S
t
D
t ε ε , . Since the 
supply and demand shocks 
D
t
S
t ε ε , are not observed, they need to be identified from the 
VAR residuals. The equations (6), (7) and (8) give directly the relationship between the 
estimated residuals (e) and the original shocks (ε ), which can be described by 
t o t A e ε = : 
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where  ij a represents the effect of shock j on variable i (through the residuals). 
Therefore we need to know the elements of  0 A to calculate the underlying supply and 
demand shocks. From (10), the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR residuals 
t yt e e π , is given by:  
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Since estimation of the VAR yields  ) , ( ), ( ), ( t yt pt yt e e Cov e Var e Var π , the 
identification of the structural model requires four restrictions being imposed on the 
VAR. The Blanchard-Quah decomposition assumes that  1 , 1
2 2 = = D S σ σ , that is 
variability of the demand and supply shocks is equal and normalized to unity. Another 
assumption is that the shocks to aggregate demand and supply are uncorrelated with 
each other,  . 0 ) , ( = D S Cov ε ε  In addition, the long-run neutrality restriction implies that 
cumulative effect of demand shocks on output must be zero, that is 
0 ) (
1
12 = ∑
∞
= j
j a (demand shocks has no permanent impact on output). Alternatively, the 
last restriction can be written as  . 0 ) 1 ( )] 1 ( 1 [ 12 22 22 12 = + − b a b a  Finally, Table 3 posited 
that positive demand shock will raise prices in both short and long run, while positive 
supply shock will lower them. These over-identifying restrictions are below used for 
interpreting the results of the model.  
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Estimation Results – Variance Decomposition  
Quarterly data was used covering the period form 1997 Q2 to 2008 Q3. Data 
source is OECD and Eurostat, with real GDP approximating output and GDP deflator 
inflation, as in other literature on the topic.
22 Table 4 presents correlation coefficients of 
the supply and demand shocks between several countries (including Estonia) and the 
euro zone. It should be noted that there is no agreed correlation coefficient benchmark 
that would indicate that a country is sufficiently synchronized with the currency. Still, as 
Table 4 and Figure 6 show, Estonia’s correlation of shocks with the euro area is low. 
Nevertheless it has been comparable to the Nordic EU countries (Finland, Sweden).
23 
Moreover, the endogeneity hypothesis of the OCA in the case of Estonia would suggest 
increasing symmetry with the euro area over time. Hence, two sub-samples were 
estimated to evaluate the changes in correlation over time. The observed improvement 
of the correlation of demand shocks between Estonia and the euro zone in 2003-08 
suggests that the synchronization indeed increased over time. This is also confirmed in 
Figure (6).
24 
 
Table 4. Correlation of supply and demand shocks with the euro area, 1997 Q2-2008 Q3  
   1997 Q2-2008 Q3  1997 Q2-2002 Q4  2003 Q1-2008Q3 
   Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply 
Estonia  -0.20  0.31  -0.50  0.29  0.14  0.34 
Finland  0.11 0.13  0.22 0.08  0.03 0.17 
Sweden  0.03  0.32  -0.07  0.24  0.11  0.41 
Note: Positive numbers indicate symmetry, negative numbers asymmetry of shocks. Source: Authors’ calculations  
                                                 
22 The VAR models satisfy the necessary requirements. Stability conditions are met, while the LM test 
indicates that residuals at 1st and 4th lags do not show signs of being correlated at the 5% level of 
significance. Standard information criteria were applied to choose the lag length. 
23 Table 3 was used in ex-post verification of the results. All Estonia’s impulse responses (7 out of 8) to 
the positive demand and supply shocks were consistent with the predictions of the underlying model (3) – 
(5) and Table 3.  
24 When CPI index (HICP) is used rather than GDP deflator, the correlation coefficient between 
Estonia’s demand shocks and those of the euro zone becomes positive, pointing to the greater 
synchronization of shocks affecting a “typical” consumer than the overall economy. To put differently, 
while specialization in production prevails, there was a greater convergence in the composition of 
spending between Estonia and the euro zone. According to Corsetti (2008), this makes regional policy 
more optimal even in the presence of uncorrelated regional shocks.  Zuzana Brixiova, Margaret H. Morgan, Andreas Wörgötter,On The Road To EURO: How Synchronized 
IS Estonia with the Euro zone? 
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Figure 6a. Demand shocks of Estonia and the euro area, 1997 Q2-2008 Q3 
 
 
Figure 6b. Supply shocks of Estonia and the euro area, 1997 Q2-2008 Q3  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
Variance decomposition of the structural VAR revealed that supply shocks 
accounted for most of the real output variability, while demand shocks accounted for 
the majority of the variability in prices. Estonia’s results are compared with those of 
Finland (Table 5). 220 
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Table 5. Variance decomposition of output growth and inflation (in percent)  
 Real  output  Inflation 
  Supply shock Demand shock Supply shock Demand shock 
Estonia  83  17  24  76 
Finland 48  52  45  55 
Source: Authors’ calculations utilizing data from the OECD National Accounts and Eurostat databases.  
 
The analysis above shows that country-specific, idiosyncratic shocks prevail in 
Estonia. The country thus needs to rely heavily on other adjustment mechanism such as 
flexibility of its economy and effective fiscal policy rather than on similarity of its 
economic shocks and business cycles with the EMU. Nevertheless, the predominance of 
asymmetric shocks does not seem to be too different from several current euro area 
members, such as Greece or Ireland, for example. The above results are consistent with 
those of the previous sections, namely that synchronization of Estonia’s shocks and 
business cycles with those of the euro area is relatively low, albeit gradually increasing 
until 2008. However, the collapse of the Estonia’s real GDP growth in 2009 has slowed 
the convergence, as it was notably more severe than in any of the euro area countries. 
2.4 Comparison of Results with the Empirical Literature 
Studies on shock synchronization of the new EU countries with the EMU, 
utilizing data prior to the crisis (until mid-2008) are summarized in Table 6:  Zuzana Brixiova, Margaret H. Morgan, Andreas Wörgötter,On The Road To EURO: How Synchronized 
IS Estonia with the Euro zone? 
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Table 6. Similarity of shocks and synchronization of business cycles –Summary of literature 
Study and 
Author(s)  Methodology Findings 
Fidrmuc and 
Korhonen (2003)  
Correlation and 
structural VAR  
Structural shocks were more asymmetric in EU 
candidate countries than the euro area.  
Lättemäe (2003)  Structural VAR  Real shocks in Estonia comparable to those of 
some of the smaller EU members.  
Trotignon (2003) 
Sectoral and 
geographical 
indicators of exposure 
to shocks 
Estonia is highly exposed to risks of external 
asymmetric shocks. 
Fidrmuc (2004)   Correlation and 
structural VAR  
Slowdown of 2000-2002 increased heterogeneity of 
demand shocks.  
Horvath and 
Ratfai (2004) 
Correlation and 
structural VAR 
Due to asymmetric shocks that accession countries 
are exposed to, costly process of adjustment after 
EMU enlargement likely. 
Demyanyk and 
Volosovych 
(2005) 
Correlations of GDP, 
consumption growth 
Economies with the most volatile and 
counter-cyclical growth - incl. Baltic states - would 
benefit from risk sharing within the EU. 
Babetskii (2005)  Structural VAR  Synchronization of shocks has increased over time.
Eickmeier and 
Breitung (2005) 
Structural factor 
model 
Poland, Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia are more 
suitable for EMU than others.  
Fidrmuc and 
Korhonen (2006)  Meta-analysis  
Several current members of the euro area appear to 
have lower business cycle correlations than new 
EU members. 
Darvas and 
Szapary (2008a) 
Price level 
convergence panel 
regression; financial 
integration 
Volatility in NMS (incl. Estonia) has been reduced, 
but is higher than in the euro area.  
Darvas and 
Szapary (2008b) 
Correlations of GDP 
and factor 
components analysis 
Baltics not synchronised (contrary to CEEs).  
Levasseur (2008)  Structural VAR  Estonia had increasingly negative correlation of 
supply shocks with the Euro area. 
Obiora (2009)  Structural VAR 
There are significant spillovers to the Baltics from 
key trading partners with those from the EU 
outweighing those from Russia.  
Fadejeva and 
Melihovs (2009) 
Dynamic factor 
model 
After 2000, economic developments between the 
Baltic States and the main euro area countries 
became more synchronized.  
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Regarding methodology, the complexity of method increased over time, as more data 
became available. While the first strand of literature typically used a simple correlation 
of the aggregate output and prices, the second one examined properties of business 
cycles using various filters, and the third one utilized structural VAR to recover 
underlying structural shocks, as was done in this paper. A dynamic factor model was 
utilized by Darvas and Szapary (2008b) and Fadejeva and Melijhovs (2009). Despite the 
various methods used, many of the studies’ can be broadly summarized as follows: (i) 
shocks of the recently acceded EU countries tend to be less synchronized with the euro 
area than shocks of most of the EMU members; (ii) synchronization of shocks may 
have increased somewhat over time, as policies pertaining to transition were replaced by 
policies and institutions that would facilitate convergence towards the EU. The findings 
for Estonia in this paper are thus broadly consistent with at least part of the empirical 
literature.  
3.  The Case for Euro Adoption  
Euro adoption has been a long-standing strategic priority of the Estonian 
government.
25 Since joining the EU, Estonia has viewed the euro adoption as the most 
appropriate exit strategy from the currency board (Lättemäe and Randweer, 2006). As of 
early 2010, Estonia was as close to realizing this goal as ever. Even prior and during the 
global financial crisis (in 2009), Estonia has been meeting most of the formal criteria of 
the euro adoption (inflation was met in November 2009); one exception has been the 
interest rates criterion which cannot be assessed because Estonia is so far lacking the 10-
year Kroon-denominated government bond. With the 2009 budget deficit amounting 
only to 1.7 percent of GDP and very low levels of government debt, the fiscal criterion 
has also been met. In Spring 2010, the European Commission endorsed Estonia's bid 
for euro adoption.  
The limited synchronization of business cycles notwithstanding, there are strong 
economic reasons for Estonia to adopt the euro. In fact from the point of view of the 
limited shock synchronization, the euro adoption will de facto change very little – Estonia 
has a fixed exchange rate regime linking the local currency to the euro and the issues 
regarding the lack of synchronization are same in both regimes. Put differently, for 
Estonia the limited synchronization is not a reason against euro adoption as its economy 
has functioned well under this regime for a number of years, and stood the test of major 
crises. And from the perspective of the EMU, the cost of admitting an unsynchronized 
member would be limited given Estonia’s small size. The costs of joining the EMU 
would not be high for Estonia, as the country incurred them when it gave up its 
independent monetary policy.
26 
In addition to limited reasons against the euro adoption, there are strong ones in 
its favor. As the financial crisis illustrated, with the currency board in place, joining the 
                                                 
25 In addition to economic reasons, the euro adoption is viewed as a symbol of becoming a part of the 
core of the European Union, achieving the aims set when Estonia regained its independence. 
26 Among the neglected euro benefits are mainly the greater independence of a big central bank as well as 
its greater technical competence and coverage of background analysis and scope for action. However, 
with the currency board in place, this benefit is minimal in the case of Estonia. Zuzana Brixiova, Margaret H. Morgan, Andreas Wörgötter,On The Road To EURO: How Synchronized 
IS Estonia with the Euro zone? 
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euro zone would bring benefits of eliminating the costs associated with currency risk 
and perceived devaluation risk. In the case of Estonia these costs are high due to the 
substantial private debt denominated in foreign currency, and hence benefits of 
eliminating them are also high.
27 Moreover, with the euro adoption, transaction cost 
would decline as the currency exchange costs would be eliminated and interest rates on 
loans decrease. This point is also made by Grubel (2005), who argues that considerable 
benefits in small countries joining a currency area come from the elimination of 
currency risks and an associated reduction of the risk premium. More broadly, for a 
small country, the traditional benefits that come from avoiding foreign exchange 
transactions within the currency area (estimated to be about 0.3 to 0.4% of national 
income) are substantial in absolute terms. Moreover, they can generate significant 
growth enhancing effects, such as deeper financial market integration. Even long before 
the financial crisis, Berger, Jensen and Schjelderup (2001) argued that in the case of 
small open economies, euro adoption benefits from reducing transaction cost and 
deeper trade and financial integration most likely outweigh potential risks of 
misalignments. 
In sum, in the case of Estonia adopting euro means incurring relatively minor 
costs while reaping major benefits. The fact that even under the difficult circumstances 
of the global crisis, Estonia had enough determination to adopt the challenging 
measures to meet the Maastricht criteria in a sustainable manner and simultaneously had 
an understanding electorate only strengthens its case for euro adoption. However, given 
the lack of synchronization with the EMU, the effective fiscal policy and flexibility of 
the product and the labor markets in Estonia are key for sustainability of its 
participation in the euro area, just as they have been essential for sustainability of the 
currency board. To raise the stabilizing role of fiscal policy and reduce output volatility, 
it is important that the country moves over the medium term to counter-cyclical stance.  
4.  Conclusions 
When Estonia joined the European Union in 2004, it agreed to replace its national 
currency by the euro at some future point. In reality, euro adoption has been Estonia’s 
long-term policy priority. With the currency board in place and the kroon pegged to the 
euro, the country already paid most of the cost of joining the EMU in terms of loss of 
independence of monetary policy. The economy has functioned well under this regime 
for a number of years, including during crises, and the role of the exchange rate has 
been replaced by flexible prices and wages and other adjustment mechanisms, such as 
flexible product markets. With the global financial and economic crisis posing a heavy 
burden on the economy, joining the EMU has become even more interesting for 
Estonia, especially since most of the costs have been already incurred. As the crisis 
illustrated, the currency board is not a substitute for the euro, adoption of which would 
                                                 
27 The crisis has brought up a number of issues for EMU members. As Dambrowski (2009) writes 
“…One of the key questions which the core euro zone members must answer is whether offering a fast-
track EMU accession opportunity to countries that remain outside the common currency area (which 
could help revive market confidence and incentivize them to adjust policies) is a better solution than 
allowing them to continue sinking into market turmoil.”  
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protect the country from possible speculative attacks and financial destabilization. 
Moreover, as euro adoption would put liquidity management under the umbrella of the 
ECB, it would be particularly beneficial for new EU countries with a high share of 
foreign currency loans, such as Estonia. 
Given the limited, albeit increasing, synchronization of Estonia’s business cycles 
with those of the EMU, for sustainability of the regime Estonian policymakers would 
need to continue to rely on adjustment mechanisms such as prudent fiscal policy and 
flexible labor and product markets. Moreover, in the past Estonia’s fiscal policies have 
amplified the cycle, especially since mid-2000s. In 2009 in particular, the tightening 
measures adopted were implemented despite the GDP collapse, but paid off with 
meeting the Maastricht fiscal criterion. To reduce output volatility in the future, the 
government aims at moving to balancing the budget over the cycle in the medium term. 
Policies stimulating rise in the knowledge and high-tech content of Estonia’s production 
to make it more akin to that of the advanced EMU economies would be also beneficial.  Zuzana Brixiova, Margaret H. Morgan, Andreas Wörgötter,On The Road To EURO: How Synchronized 
IS Estonia with the Euro zone? 
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Annex I 
Estimations were carried out using Eviews version 6 and Stata version 10.1 for 
time period from 1997 Q2 to 2008 Q3, 46 observations. Data sources were Eurostat, 
OECD National Accounts and Statistics Estonia databases. The euro area used was the 
15 members as at December 2008, namely Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia 
and Spain. First differences of the natural logarithms of level of the real GDP and its 
deflator were stationary for all countries or regions. Results of the stationarity tests 
(ADF, KPSS) are in Table 1A. Output was measured by quarterly, seasonally adjusted, 
real GDP, while the price level by the quarterly, seasonally adjusted, GDP deflator.  
 
Table 1A. Stationarity tests (ADF, KPSS) /1  
   First observation in 
levels of GDP data 
Number of 
observations ADF 
p 
values 
(ADF) 
KPSS 
Real GDP (first difference of ln)             
euro area  1995Q1  54  -3.9455 0.0034  0.1399 
Estonia 1995Q1  54  -4.0627 0.0024  0.1097 
Finland  1995Q1  54  -2.9862 0.0428  0.2986 
Finland-Sweden 1995Q1  54  -2.2405 0.1951  0.1436 
Scandinavia-Baltic 1995Q1  54  -7.5597 0.0000  0.2038 
OECD 1996Q1  50 -2.9911 0.0427  0.2312 
GDP deflator (first difference of ln)             
euro area  1995Q1  54  -5.0600 0.0001  0.1699 
Estonia  1995Q1  54  -3.8343 0.0047  0.3555 
Finland 1995Q1  54  -5.3835 0.0000  0.1014 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 1/ Applies for VAR models described by (1) and (2)-(4). For the ADF test, bold indicates 
stationarity at 5% level of confidence (p values of 0.05). For the KPSS, bold indicates acceptance of the null hypothesis of 
stationarity. 
 
Information criterion (Akaike, Schwarz, and Hannon-Quinn) was used to choose 
the lag length. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test indicated that the residuals at 1
st and 
4
th lags are not serially correlated at the 5% significance level. The Jarque-Bera test 
suggests that most data are from a normal distribution.
28  
                                                 
28 Further information on all data sources as well as results of all tests can be found at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/43/43886057.xls , Tables A1- A5.  
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